Arbitration Agreement Doctor California


The courts have rejected clauses in agreements that disrupt the finality of the arbitrator`s decision. In Beynon v. Garden Grove Medical Group,[126] the Tribunal rejected an arbitration agreement allowing the health care provider to dismiss the arbitrator`s decision and resubmit the dispute to another arbitration panel of three physicians. The court found this provision invalid because the applicant had never given his consent and the provision contrary to public policy was void. [127] The original award of the arbitration was final. Again, prior to the enactment of Section 1295, an appeled court held that an arbitration agreement was valid to retain the patient when the signatory acted as the patient`s representative, but not valid to bind the same signatory who asserted a derivative claim. In Rhodes, the Court of Appeal found the arbitration agreement valid against the non-signatory but invalid wife in order to bind the husband`s right to the loss of the consortium, although the husband, who was acting as his wife`s agent, signed the arbitration agreement. [113] The court also decided that the agreement does not apply to the couple`s son who, as the court found, had an independent means of his mother`s unlawful death. [114] Rhodes found that the son had constitutional and procedural rights to deal with his case, given that the ground was formed prior to the adoption of Section 1295. This argument should not be valid in light of Gross`s finding that the neutrality of arbitrators should be sacrosanct. Although the California Arbitration Act allows each party to choose one of three arbitrators, the third arbitrator must be neutral and disinterested.

It is important that this third arbitrator reveals possible conflicts of interest. The California Supreme Court should address this issue and require the third neutral arbitrator to disclose any potential conflict of interest. Each party should then have the opportunity to compel the dismissal of that interested arbitrator. Finally, the nature of the arbitration procedure is disturbed and public order is violated when a clause in an arbitration agreement threatens the finality of the arbitrator`s decision. Beynon and Saika considered that these clauses were unenforceable. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of those clauses does not affect either the validity of the Treaty or the applicability of the Treaty to non-contractual provisions. The California Supreme Court should uphold Beynon and Saika in finding any contractual provision that threatens the finality of an arbitrator`s decision to be unenforceable. In accordance with this result and fifteen years after the adoption of Section 1295, Gold v. Saika[128], an arbitration provision, in full conformity with the provisions of ยง 1295, was found to be inapplicable for breach of public order.

This special arbitration agreement on toxic pills contained a clause that allows each party to fail to comply with the award if the award is greater than 25,000 $US. The Tribunal emphasized that the nature of the arbitration proceedings was final[129] and that a forced conciliation proceeding was an equitable remedy for the specific performance of a contract. [130] Since the de novo trial clause was not applicable for reasons of fairness, the Tribunal found the arbitral award to the applicant to be valid and final, in accordance with the concept of purpose of the arbitration proceedings. Saika suggested that her finding be consistent with a California Supreme Court ruling that arbitral awards cannot be reviewed for errors of law, even if the result is to tolerate considerable injustice. [131] Therefore, any clause in an arbitration contract that disrupts the finality of an arbitral award is likely considered unenforceable by the courts under California law. [117] Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1295 (e) provides that the contract of arbitration is neither a contract of adhesion, nor ruthless, nor inappropriate if it complies with subdivisions (a), b) and (c). . . .


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